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An Introduction
Patents Versus Patients: Must We Choose?
Cynthia M Ho*
Ann Weilbaecher*
Are patents a tool for promoting the development of medical treatments
for patients or merely a roadblock to access to health care? This is a
perennial question to which there are often strenuous opinions. This
Symposium Issue complements the Second Annual Beazley Symposium on
Access to Health Care, "Perspectives on Patents and Patients: Can They
Coexist?," by providing a variety of perspectives on the increasingly
important intersection between patents, health care access and innovation.
Whether there is any need to "choose" between patents and patients is an
intriguing yet controversial question. To some, patents seem to clearly
undermine the goal of providing drugs at the lowest possible costs because
the exclusivity inherent with patent rights provides an incentive for profits.
To others, there is no conflict at all because patents are seen as the driver of
innovation that will inevitably benefit all of society and even facilitate the
genesis for low-cost generic drugs. So, which view is correct, or is neither?
Prior to discussing whether a choice is necessary, it is important to
understand some fundamentals of patent law. Patents are granted by
national governments to applicants who establish that an invention is new,
useful, and not "obvious" to someone in the same technical area as the
inventor.1 For example, once penicillin has been discovered and publicly
disclosed, no one can thereafter claim a patent on penicillin because it
° Cynthia M. Ho, J.D., Clifford E. Vickrey Research Professor of Law, Loyola University
Chicago School of Law.
- Ann Weilbaecher, Juris Doctor expected December 2009, Loyola University Chicago
School of Law; Editor-in-Chief, Annals of Health Law.
The Annals of Health Law Executive Board and staff would like to extend our appreciation
to the authors for their thoughtful collaboration throughout the editorial process. We would
also like to thank the Beazley Institute and our Annals faculty advisors, Professor Lawrence
Singer and Professor John Blum, for their continued support, encouragement, and
mentorship.
1. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2006) (providing requirements for patentable inventions in
the United States). A patent application must also comply with certain requirements to
ensure that the public will be in possession of the invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
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would not be "new." 2 If, on the other hand, the first person to create a drug
to treat cancer obtains a patent on the drug, the inventor will be able to
exclude all others from making the patented cancer treatment.3 The ability
to exclude all others can enable that inventor to charge a high cost-
4
especially if it is the only drug available for that treatment. Moreover, a
patent also increases costs for researchers who want to use the patented
drug as the basis for developing further innovations; some researchers and
companies may strategically decide to ignore research in certain areas to
avoid either patent liability or high costs in licensing the patented drug for
further research.5
Not surprisingly, patents are often a target of criticism concerning the
price of drugs and the extent to which price limits access to medicine.6 The
cost of medication is an issue for all countries. In the current economic
climate, patients are highly sensitive to costs. Even in the United States,
some consumers forego filling prescription drugs because of inadequate
funds. 7 In other countries, newer -and more expensive- drugs may also be
hard to access.8 Moreover, although drug prices are often the focus, patents
and their concomitant costs may extend far beyond traditional drug
discovery because of the expansive scope of patentability to include
medical tests, software, and so forth. 9
2. See 35 U.S.C. §102(a) (2006).
3. See 35 U.S.C. §271 (a) (2006) (providing the owner of a patent the ability to exclude
all others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the patented invention).
4. This may not be true in all countries, but it is in the United States where there are no
price controls on medicines.
5. In the United States, there is no general exception to patent liability for researchers -
even academic researchers can be liable for patent infringement. See Madey v. Duke, 307 F.
3d 1351, 1361-62 (Fed Cir. 2002).
6. On the other hand, defenders of patents often note that there are many issues that may
impede access, including the fact that inadequate infrastructure, as well as tariffs and taxes
on imported drugs can impose costs. E.g., Roger Bate, Why Taxes and Tariffs on Medicines
in Developing Nations Is a Fatal Policy, MEDICAL PROGRESS TODAY, May 5, 2005,
http://www.aei.org/article/22471; Roger Bate & Richard Tren, The Real Obstacles to Sound
Treatment of AIDS in Poor Countries, AEI OUTLOOK, July 2004, http://www.aei.org/
outlook/20841.
7. Kevin Sack, Slump Pushing Cost of Drugs Out of Reach, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2009, at
Al (noting that customers are often not filling or refilling all their prescriptions because of
limited funds).
8. See Gardiner Harris, The Evidence Gap: British Balance Benefit vs. Cost of Latest
Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2008, at Al.
9. See, e.g., COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECON., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21sT CENTURY 45 (Stephen
Merrill et al. eds., 2004) (noting that patentable subject matter has been expanding and is of
concern to some), available at http://ww.nap.edu/html/patentsystem/0309089107.pdf
[hereinafter NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL]. To some extent, there has since been recognition
that the scope of patentable subject matter may be too broad. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme
Court has granted certiorari to revisit this question. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir.
[Vol. 18
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I. ARE PATENTS ESSENTIAL FOR INNOVATION?
Some suggest that without patents, we would have no drugs. It is true
that most pharmaceutical companies today have business models built
around strong patent portfolios. Companies that develop new drugs suggest
that patent protection is critical because drugs are simple to reverse
engineer, such that another company could easily and unfairly appropriate
profits without the protection of patents.'0 Drug companies also point to the
fact that the regulatory approval process required before a drug can be sold
can diminish the effective patent term. 11 They argue that since a drug
cannot be sold without regulatory approval regardless of its patent situation,
companies are justified in charging higher costs during the shortened patent
term. 12  In addition, they note that because generics can quickly and
effectively compete once the patent term expires, the patent exclusivity is
critical to recoup some of the cost of drug discovery and to provide enough
financial support to enable new research.' 3 While this may sound logical,
critics are skeptical of this argument because the amount of research money
is actually often eclipsed by money spent on marketing and administration
of drugs.14
Moreover, patents are not the only driver of innovation. Even in the
context of drug discovery, there have been major innovations that were
made without any patent incentives. Dr. Salk, inventor of the revolutionary
polio vaccine, never patented his invention.' 5 Researchers today often have
less choice than Dr. Salk. Due to a 1980 law entitled the Bayh-Dole Act,
2008), cert granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3442 (U.S. Jun. 1, 2009) (No. 08-964). Although this case
does not directly involve pharmaceuticals, or even a health-related invention, any
modification to the standard of patentability will necessarily impact access to health care
treatments.
10. E.g., Henry Grabowski, Patents, Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuticals, 5
J. INT'L ECON. L. 849, 851 (2002); Gregory J. Glover, Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am.,
Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace, Statement before the Federal Trade
Commission and the Department of Justice-Antitrust Division 6-7 (Mar. 19, 2002), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020319gregoryjglover.pdf.
11. Grabowski, supra note 10, at 852.
12. Glover, supra note 10, at 4.
13. Id. at 4-5, 7.
14. See MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES 37-49 (2004); Marc-
Andre Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of
Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, 5 PLOS MED. 29, 29 (2008).
15. Dr. Salk is famous for not only creating the important vaccine, but also for not
seeking a patent. It is reported that when asked by a reporter who owned the patent to the
vaccine, Salk replied, "Well, the people, I would say. There is no patent. Could you patent
the sun?", http://www.umw.edu/hisa/resources/Student%20Projects/McCreedy/students.
umw.edu/_lmccr9sd/poliovaccine/significance.html (last visited Jul. 2, 2009). However,
later in his career, he did actually file for and obtain a patent for an AIDS vaccine sold under
the brand name Remune. U.S. Patent No. 5,256,767 (filed Nov. 10, 1992) (issued Oct. 26,
1993).
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universities can claim patent rights in federally funded inventions. 16 This
law has had a major impact in academic culture towards patents. Now,
most universities require their employees to file for patents in the hope that
they too can share in the patent profits. Although such profits are elusive -
few universities make money and many even lose money once the costs of
patenting efforts are considered - the patent culture is nonetheless a strong
one.17 Indeed, other countries seem eager to implement the Bayh-Dole Act
despite the lack of concrete evidence that it has reaped true rewards.' 8
However, while there is a strong trend towards patenting by academic
scientists, others are opposed to widespread patenting - especially with
regard to research tools that might prevent other scientists from creating
further innovations. The federal government initially sought to patent
sequences of the human genome but subsequently withdrew its patent
applications after public protests. 19 Some scientists publish rather than
patent their innovations, and others have collaborated in ways to ensure that
their research results will be freely available.2 °
II. WHAT IS THE REAL IMPACT OF A PRO-PATENT CULTURE?
The lure of patent profits may have a significant impact on the path of
scientific research and development. An obvious impact is that the most
lucrative diseases, rather than the most devastating social diseases, attract
research dollars. In some cases, the two can be the same - such as in the
case of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). However, for many
diseases that primarily effect developing countries, patents provide little
incentive because such countries do not have resources to pay for any
potential cures; not surprisingly, there are few patents or drugs developed
16. See Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006).
17. JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF HIGHER
EDUCATION 230 (2005); see John E. Tyler, Advancing University Innovation: More Must Be
Expected-More Must Be Done, 10 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 143, 179-80, 210-11 (2009); see
also ANNA S. NILSSON ET AL., ITPS, SWEDISH INSTITUTE FOR GROWTH POLICY STUDIES,
COMMERCIALIZATION OF LIFE-SCIENCE RESEARCH AT UNIVERSITIES IN THE UNITED STATES,
JAPAN AND CHINA 11 (2006), available at http://www.itps.se/Archive/Documents/Swedish/
Publikationer/Rapporter/Allm%C3%A4nna/A2006/A2006_006%20webb.pdf
18. See, e.g., Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly Financed Research and
Development Bill, 2008, Bill B46B-2008 (S. Afr.); Anthony D. So et al., Is Bayh Dole Good
for Developing Countries? Lessons from the US Experience, 6 PLoS BIOLOGY 2078, 2078
(2008), available at http://biology.plosjoumals.org/archive/1 545-7885/6/1 0/pdf/
10.137 ljoumal.pbio.0060262-L.pdf.
19. See Christopher Anderson, NIH Drops Bid for Gene Patents, 263 SCIENCE 909
(1994).
20. See, e.g.,, Press Release, National Human Genome Research Inst., NIH,
International HapMap Consortium Widens Data Access (Dec. 10, 2004),
http://www.genome.gov/12514423; CAMBIA BiOS, Initiative for Open Innovation,
http://www.bios.net/daisy/bios/home.html.
[Vol. 18
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for such diseases. 2 1 In addition, even among diseases that afflict people in
wealthy countries with the ability to pay, there is still a disproportionate
focus on drugs that have mass appeal and have the potential to generate
large profits - i.e. the blockbuster mentality. Some have suggested that this
has led to an overabundance of drugs that all treat the same condition - so-
called "me-too" drugs - that are very similar whether they treat acid reflux,
depression, or erectile dysfunction.22 In some cases, multiple drugs within
the same class give patients more options. However, often the new drugs
do not demonstrate improved efficacy.23 That is not necessarily surprising
since neither patent nor regulatory laws require that a drug be more
efficacious than existing drugs.24
Some are beginning to question the traditional model of using profits
from patented drugs to fund research. After all, despite increasing research
spending, the actual output of the pharmaceutical industry seems to be
21. See Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory
Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 853, 892 (2003)
("[A] 2001 Harvard School of Public Health survey of twenty large pharmaceutical firms
found that '[o]f 11 responders, eight had done no research over the past year in tuberculosis,
malaria, African sleeping sickness, leishmaniasis, or Chagas disease; seven spent less than
1% of their research and development budget on any of these disorders."). The lack of
attention on neglected diseases is also reflect by the efforts of the World Health Assembly to
modestly increase the amount of spending on such diseases from the current level of three
percent of global research to twelve percent. World Health Organization [WHO], Executive
Bd. 124th Session, Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property: Global Strategy and
Plan of Action: Proposed Time Frames and Estimated Funding Needs, 1, EB124/16 Add.2
(Jan. 21, 2009), available at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/EBl24/B124 16Add2-
en.pdf. This is particularly significant since there has long been a discussion of a 10/90 gap
in reference to the fact that only ten percent of research dollars go towards disease that affect
90% of the population. GLOBAL FORUM FOR HEALTH RESEARCH, 10/90 REPORT 2003-2004 35
(2004); see Michael R. Reich, The Global Drug Gap, 287 SCIENCE 1979 (2000). However, it
turns out that the reality is that even reaching ten percent is sadly just an aspiration at
present.
22. ANGELL, supra note 14, at 74-83.
23. Id. at 75.
24. United States patent laws require an invention to be new, useful, and nonobvious -
efficacy is not required. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2006). In addition, regulatory
laws applicable to approving a drug for sale require demonstration of safety and efficacy, but
not improved efficacy. While most countries have similar patent and regulatory laws, India is
attempting to use patent laws to direct research towards more innovative drugs with a new
patent requirement that variations on existing drug compounds are not patentable unless they
show improved efficacy. The Patents Act, No. 15 of 2005; India Code (2005), 3(d). This
provision is highly controversial and may be subject to international challenge for a potential
noncompliance with TRIPS; an international agreement that mandates certain patent
standards, including nondiscrimination in the area of technology, such as pharmaceuticals.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC , 33 I.L.M.
1208 (1994). There was one case in India challenging this section on this ground; the Indian
Supreme Court found the law to be Constitutional and declined to opine on compliance with
international law. Novartis v. Union of India, (2007) 4 M.L.J. 1153.
2009]
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decreasing in terms of innovative new drugs in the pipeline.25 In addition,
the high costs of patented drugs may actually promote counterfeiting since
there is a market of people looking for cheaper alternatives.26 Moreover,
the patent system may not even be working for patent owners. Even with
patents, the first market entrant in a particular class of disease, such as
heartburn, typically dominates the market for only about a year before the
next "me too" drug enters and potentially captures a large share of the
market. In addition, once a generic enters the market, prices and profits
quickly plummet.
III. BEYOND PILLS TO BIOTECH
As difficult as the questions are about patient access to traditional
drugs, the issues become increasingly more complex in the area of
biotechnology. Patents on gene sequences or other related products can
have pernicious effects on access not only by patients, but also by other
researchers. A patented gene may effectively prevent patients from access
to diagnostic tests based on that gene because the patent owner has the
power to price the test without limits - at least in the United States where
there are no price controls on diagnostic tests. This can be further
exacerbated by other areas of law beyond patents. For example, Medicare
may decline to reimburse what is not necessary for treatment, 27 so if a
patented test "only" predicts predisposition, but does not actually treat the
disease, a patient may have no ability to pay for this test. Even outside the
Medicare context, some private insurers may be reluctant to pay what seems
like exorbitant costs charged by some patent owners. Myriad Technology,
owner of the isolated BRCA- 1 and BRCA-2 gene patents that predicts some
types of breast cancer,28 is one infamous example since the company
25. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT:
SCIENCE, BUSINESS, REGULATORY, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES CITED AS
HAMPERING DRUG DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 16 (2006), available at
www.gao.gov/new.items/d0749.pdf. NAT'L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. RESEARCH AND
EDUC. FOUND., CHANGING PATTERNS OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 3 (2002), available
at http://www.pcij.org/blog/wp-docs/ChangingPattemsof PharmaceuticalInnovation.pdf;
Avery Johnson & Ron Winslow, Drug Makers Say FDA Safety Focus is Slowing New
Medicine Pipeline, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2008, at Al (noting that the FDA approved only 19
new drugs in 2007 - the fewest in 24 years).
26. E.g., Kevin Outterson & Ryan Smith, Counterfeit Drugs: The Good, The Bad and
The Ugly, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 525, 537 (2006); WHO, What Encourages
Counterfeiting of Drugs?, http://www.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/faqs/16/en/
index.html (last visited July 5, 2009).
27. See Social Security Act of 1965 § 1862(a)(1)(A) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
1395y(a)(l)(A) (2006)).
28. U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed Jun. 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,710,001 (filed Jun.
7, 1995).
[Vol. 18
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charged thousands of dollars for its predictive tests. 29 Moreover, patented
genes may impact the course of research; studies show that research has
been delayed, limited or discontinued because of concern about violating
gene patents.3°
In the past, many assumed that a wealth of diagnostic and medical
treatments would quickly result from sequencing the human genome. There
was once a "gold rush" mentality to patenting genes presumed to be critical
in leading to new treatments, including ones that could be "personalized"
on an individual level. However, the science is actually quite complex -
most diseases and conditions are the result of more than one gene - such
that patents on individual genes may have little if any true commercial
utility. The more scientists learn, the more they realize that their initial
predictions were overly optimistic. 31  Genes may have limited value in
predicting disease let alone resulting in cures of diseases. Moreover, large
numbers of patients are needed to do research in this area, yet patents on
genetic material that result from patient research may actually
disenfranchise patients and make them less likely to participate in research.
IV. SHIFTING TIDES
The tide may be turning against patents. There are major calls for patent
reform in general.32  One theme is that patents are issued too easily.
33
29. See Adam Cresswell, A Price on Your Genes, THE AUSTRALIAN, Jul. 30, 2008,
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,24097920-28737,00.htm; Arthur
Kaplan, Breast Cancer Gene Tests- Not Worth the Price?, MSNBC.COM, Oct. 8, 2008,
http://www.msbc.msn.com/id/27089268./. Although some countries such as Canada openly
flouted Myriad's patent, many more patients have had limited access due to the high cost
Myriad charged for its test. See Donald J. Willison & Stuart M. MacLeod, Patenting of
Genetic Material: Are the Benefits to Society Realized?, 167 CMAJ 259, 260 (2002)
(discussing Ontario's continued defiance of Myriad's patent claim). In addition, while one
patent was invalidated in Europe, and another narrowed, the patents currently remain in
force in the United States and thus continue to limit availability of medical treatment,
although there is current litigation initiated by the ACLU that currently challenges Myriad's
patent. For background on the European dispute, see Jordan Paradise, European Opposition
to Exclusive Control Over Predictive Breast Cancer Testing and the Inherent Implications
for U.S. Patent Law and Public Policy: A Case Study of the Myriad Genetics' BRCA Patent
Controversy, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 133, 133-45 (2004); Andrew Pollack, Patent on Test for
Cancer Revoked, N.Y. TIMEs, May 19, 2004, at C3.
30. Mildred K. Cho, et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical
Genetic Testing Services, J. OF MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS, 3, 3-8 (2003); Jon F. Merz et al.,
Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test, 415 NATURE 577, 577-79 (2002).
31. See Nicholas Wade, Genes Show Limited Value in Predicting Disease, N.Y. TIMES,
April 16, 2009, at Al (discussing recent commentary in the New England Journal of
Medicine that analyzes the increasingly recognized complexity of analyzing genetic
components of common diseases).
32. See e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 11 1th Cong. (2009).
33. E.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 9. The U.S. Supreme Court has
attempted to address the problem by noting that the prior rule on obviousness was improper.
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While a problem in all areas, an overabundance of "bad" patents in the
health care field has immense implications for access to health care.34 In
addition, there is clear concern by some about the impact of patents not
only on patient access to medical treatments, but also on subsequent
innovation. Recently, a group of cancer patients have challenged the
validity of gene patents in the United States.35 The patients may lose on
substantive grounds, but their challenges may represent a shift in public
perception regarding patents that could herald possible reform of patents.
For example, legislation has been previously proposed to amend patent laws
to include more generous exceptions for scientific research, as well as
clinical tests. 36 Perhaps the time is ripe to bring back such legislation.
Some drug companies seem to understand that their former business
model of primarily selling drugs at a high price to all countries is also
changing. Although pharmaceutical companies assert that they provide
lower prices to poor countries, voluntary discounts are actually infrequent
and discounted prices are often still much higher than the cost of generics.
For example, in 2003, Bristol Myers Squibb asserted that it was selling HIV
treatment below cost to poor countries in Africa, but generic manufacturers
thereafter marketed the same drug for a lower price.37 While the price at
which most drugs (beyond HIV treatment) are sold is among one of the
most closely guarded secrets - together with the "costs" of research and
development - there are signs that companies are bowing to public pressure
to engage in more differential pricing. In particular, pharmaceutical giant
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) recently announced that it would cut prices in the
world's poorest countries.38 In particular, GSK stated that it would cut
prices for the poorest fifty countries so that they encompass no more than
twenty-five percent of the price of the cost in wealthy nations.39  While
some are critical of GSK's price cuts as not going far enough, they
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427-28 (2007).
34. While legislative reform of patents is actually not primarily motivated by concern
about access to medical treatment, it is implicated.
35. John Schwartz, Cancer Patients Challenge the Patenting of a Gene, N.Y. TIMEs,
May 12, 2009, at A16.
36. Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R. 3967, 107th
Cong, §§ 2-3 (2002). A more recent proposal regarding the same problem would have
banned patents on genetic material altogether. See Genomic Research and Accessibility Act,
H.R. 977, 110th Cong. §106 (2007).
37. Julian Meldrum & Theo Smart, South African HIV Treatment to Depend on Generic
Drugs, AIDSMAP NEWS, Aug. 7, 2003, http://www.aidsmap.com/en/news/F5E96962-F1B4-
40F2-8969-624AC8A7D424.asp.
38. E.g., Jeanne Whalen, Glaxo Plans to Cut Drug Prices in Poorest Countries, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 13, 2009, at D6. At the same time, GSK stated that it would invest a percentage
of its profits in medical infrastructure, such as health clinics and also contribute patents to a
pool for neglected diseases - excluding AIDS. Id.
39. Id.
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nonetheless suggest an important, if only incremental, shift towards
acknowledging that a one-size-fits all pricing system is no longer
appropriate.4°
V. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR NEW SOLUTIONS
There is also broad international support for considering new solutions.
In a highly significant development, the World Health Organization (WHO)
adopted a resolution for a global strategy and plan of action on issues
surrounding public health, intellectual property and innovation in May,
2008.4 1 The resolution calls for new proposals for funding that would
stimulate research and development (R&D) for neglected diseases typically
unsupported by patents because the market is too small or uncertain.42 In
addition, the Annex to the resolution provides specific proposals to
consider, including a global R&D treaty43 as well as new incentive schemes
to delink R&D costs from the price of drugs such as prize awards.
44
One proposal supported by the WHO and others is the creation of patent
"pools" that would enable patents to be part of the solution. A patent pool
involves an agreement by at least two patent owners to share (pool) their
patents and license them to each other as well as to third parties. The patent
pool provides a "one stop" shopping for patents related to a certain
technology. "Pooling" together relevant patents for a particular subject
matter for licensing can reduce barriers to entry and foster development of
needed drugs. Historically, pharmaceutical companies were not inclined to
pool patents because they stood to gain more from selling drugs on their
own; prior successful patent pools often involved areas where companies
clearly needed pools, such as when there was a universal standard.45
40. Brook Baker, Health Gap Global Access Project Campaigns, GSK Access to
Medicines: The Good, the Bad, and the Illusory (Feb. 15, 2009),
http://www.healthgap.org/bakeronGSK.htm (offering praise for extensions of price discounts
to a wider scope of diseases while simultaneously offering criticisms that the discounts will
not cover all countries in need and that the discounts may still be too expensive for targeted
consumers).
41. Sixty-First World Health Assembly, Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public
Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property, WHA61.21, at 1 (May 24, 2008), available at
http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/A6I/A6 l_R21-en.pdf.
42. The document refers to stimulating R&D for "Type II and Type II1" diseases. Type
11 diseases occur in all countries, but a substantial proportion of cases occur in poor
countries. Type III diseases overwhelmingly or exclusively occur in developing countries.
By contrast, Type I diseases occur in rich and poor countries, with large numbers affected in
all countries. Id. at 7.
43. WHA61.21, Annex, para 30, 2.3(c) (proposing an "essential health and biomedical
R&D treaty.")
44. WHA61.21, Annex, para 36, 5.3(a).
45. See e.g., Ted J. Ebersol et al., Patent Pools and Standard Setting in Diagnostic
Genetics, 23 NATuRE BIOTECHNOLOGY, 937-38 (2005).
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Despite the lack of much precedent for patent pools in the area of
pharmaceuticals, there are some signs of possible pools in the near future.
For example, GSK made headlines this past year when it announced that it
will set up a pool for patents on neglected diseases.46 While some assert
that GSK's announcement is mostly a publicity move that does too little in
that it explicitly excludes HIV drugs, any endorsement of patent pools by a
47private company is still a major departure from the past. In addition, a
patent pool that applies to HIV may in fact come into being. Last summer,
UNITAID, a UN supported agency that purchases drugs,48 announced that it
supported a patent pool for medicine. 49 The initial focus of the pool will be
on pediatric anti-retrovirals (ARVs) and new combinations, both of which
could be greatly aided by a pool - the majority of the 22 ARVs currently
available are either not approved for pediatric use or are not available in
appropriate formulations.5°  Moreover, fixed dose combinations can
increase patient adherence, reducing resistance rates, as well as overall
health. However, such combinations often require multiple patents, thus
making them difficult to manufacture without a pool. In addition, although
HIV treatment has been recently more affordable due to extensive generic
competition, the cost of treatment is rapidly escalating for both improved
first-line treatments, as well as patented second-line treatments. 5'
46. See e.g., Sarah Bosely, Profits Before the Poor? Drugs Giant Offers an Answer to
the Toxic Question Facing a 'Heartless' Industry, GUARDIAN, Feb. 14, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/feb/14/gsk-big-pharma-drugs. At the same time it
announced its patent pool, GSK also announced that it would provide discounted prices in
the 60 poorest countries of the world and also provide funding for creating infrastructure.
Whalen, supra note 38, at D6. In particular, GSK promised to cap the price of drugs in the
poorest 50 nations to no more than 25% of the cost of drugs in wealthy nations. Included
drugs include malaria, tuberculosis, and hepatitis, as well as HIV, to the extent that HIV
drugs are not already offered at this rate. GSK also promised to invest 20% of profits made
in least developed countries to build health care infrastructure in such countries. Id.
47. Baker, supra note 40; posting of James Love to Knowledge Ecology Notes: The KEI
Staff Blog, KEI Reaction to GSK Announcement on Patent Pool for Neglected Diseases,
http://www.keionline.orgIblogs/2009/02/19/gsk-patent-pool/ (Feb. 19, 2009); posting of
Sumathi Chandrashekaran to SpicylP, GSK Floats Patent Pool for Neglected Diseases,
http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2009/02/spicyip-tidbit-gsk-floats-patent-pool.html (Feb. 17,
2009, 15:59 IST).
48. The organization has only been in existence since 2006. Its purchasing power is
subsidized by taxes on airline tickets. See UNITAID donors, http://www.unitaid.eu/en/
UNITAID-donors.html (last visited June 30, 2009).
49. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Effort for Lower Drug Prices Would Focus on Gaining
Patents, N.Y. TiMES, July 8, 2008, at F6.
50. See Mddecins Sans Frontires (MSF) [Doctors Without Borders], MSF Briefing
Note, Taking the Plunge: The UNITAID Patent Pool - A New Tool for Achieving Access to
Medicines (Jan. 20, 2009), http://www.msfaccess.org/fileadmin/userupload/medinnov
_accesspatents/BriefingNotePatentPoolsJan2009.pdf.
51. MSF reports that whereas the previously recommended regimen cost less than $100
per patient per year, the newer first-line treatments recommended by the WHO cost $600-
1,000. Id. The difference is prices is in part attributable to the fact India must now provide
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UNITAID's goal is to implement the pool by the end of 2009.
These proposals - an R&D treaty, prizes and patent pools - represent
international endorsement for new solutions to address current problems
with health care access and innovation. Some, such as patent pools, can
help to minimize patent thickets that would otherwise exist and block
needed innovation in developing treatments based on existing patented
drugs. Similarly, prizes can work in lieu of, or alongside, the patent system
to provide an additional mechanism to promote innovation that may avoid
the traditional problem whereby profit margins create a bias in favor of
lucrative drugs. In addition, the WHO resolution as a whole provides
strong support for the need to create new solutions to promote innovation
for neglected diseases. Although the patent system has long been
recognized as failing to provide an adequate incentive in this area, the
WHO resolution is an important milestone that may signal a major shift
towards prioritizing the need to promote incentives for diseases with low
profit margins.
VI. SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES
Against this backdrop of growing skepticism of patents as well as
spiraling health care costs, this Symposium Issue offers some important
criticisms as well as solutions to be considered. A single solution is
unlikely for such a complex and charged topic as "choosing" between
patents and patients - particularly since some believe that there is no choice
necessary at all. A diversity of voices and perspectives are offered that
extend beyond traditional legal academia. Articles are presented by globally
recognized advocates for promoting better access to medical treatments, a
legal academic, an academic medical researcher, and practicing lawyers
with advanced degrees in scientific fields. These differing roles and
dimensions of expertise help illustrate a variety of perspectives on patents
and their impact on access. The articles can be broadly categorized as
highlighting current problems as well as offering possible solutions.
The Symposium Issue begins with a proposal to promote innovation and
patents on pharmaceutical products - instead of only processes - as a member of the World
Trade Organization. See, e.g., MSF, Will the Lifeline of Affordable Medicines for Poor
Countries be Cut?: Consequences of Medicines Patenting in India, 2-3 (Feb. 2005),
http://msf.fr/drive/2005-02-01-msf.pdf. WTO membership requires adherence to the related
agreements, including TRIPS, which imposes minimum levels of patent protection on all
members. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 33
I.L.M. 1143 (1994).
52. UNITAID, The Medicines Patent Pools Initiative (March 2009), available at
http://www.who.int/hiv/amds/unitaidpatentpool2 2009.pdf; P.T. Jyothi Datta, Dng
Patent Pool Proposal Gets a Push, THE HINDU BusINEss LINE, June 24, 2009,
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2009/06/25/stories/2009062552380100.htm.
11
Ho and Weilbaecher: An Introduction - Patents versus Patients: Must We Choose
Published by LAW eCommons, 2009
xii Annals of Health Law [Vol. 18
access beyond the patent system. In particular, James Love, the
Symposium keynote speaker, together with Tim Hubbard, discuss the utility
of prizes in stimulating medical innovation, controlling costs, and ensuring
greater access to new medicines and vaccines. The idea of using prizes,
which offer a cash-only reward rather than exclusivity that accompanies
patents, is of growing interest to both domestic and international
communities. In "Prizes for Innovation of New Medicine and Vaccines,"
the authors explore four increasingly ambitious prize options, each
addressing flaws in the current patent system. The first option replaces the
exclusive rights to make, sell or use a product following Food and Drug
Administration approval with a cash prize fund, linked to the impact of the
product on health outcomes. The second option builds upon the first and
utilizes prizes to offer open source dividends to reward the sharing of
knowledge, data and technology. The third option introduces prizes at an
earlier stage of the research and development process, and sets up multiple
competitive intermediaries to award prizes for interim benchmarks and
discrete technical problems. The final option suggests a system for
enabling subsequent users to easily use patented material subject only to
compensation, but not an injunction. This proposal is aimed at eliminating
patent thickets that may otherwise block subsequent research. The authors
discuss both historical support for such a system, as well as possible
obstacles. The authors conclude that while a system of prizes to reward
drug development is an admittedly radical approach, it is far preferable to
the expense and minimal productivity of the current system.
In the second article, "Patents & Progress of Personalized Medicine:
Biomarkers as Lens," Professor Matthew Herder returns to the field of
patents, but to a previously under-explored issue of the extent to which
patents play a role in promoting "personalized medicine." The term
"personalized medicine" is commonly associated with the idea that science
has progressed to the stage where patients will be able to obtain tailored
treatments. However, as this article discusses, that idea is more of a fiction
than a reality at the present time. Professor Herder focuses on "biomarkers"
- biological predictors of disease - as an example of the inadequacies of
patent law in fostering personalized medicine. He begins by explaining
regulatory and market deficiencies in biomarkers research, but makes the
broader point that patents have played a significant role in the problem of
coordination among scientists, research institutions, healthcare providers,
and commercial actors. He then addresses the debate surrounding patenting
"upstream research," and reviews the existing data regarding the impact of
such patenting upon research and development. The author sets forth a
series of questions for future research to more fully define the barriers to
biomarkers research and to uncover which corrective measures may be
effective. The author concludes by recommending an integration of
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regulatory and patent reforms, with a call to action by scholars, scientists,
representatives of the biopharmaceutical industry, and policy-makers.
Dr. Michael Tomasson provides an interesting comparative medical
perspective on bottlenecks to developing genomic tests. While his article,
"Legal, Ethical, and Conceptual Bottlenecks to the Development of Useful
Genomic Tests," focuses on genomic tests, it shares similar issues with the
area of biomarkers. This article discusses advances in genomic research
and genomic testing in the context of the debate surrounding gene patent
rights and the limited rights of patient-participants in translational research.
Dr. Tomasson describes his research at Washington University School of
Medicine to discover tyrosine kinase mutations in acute myeloid leukemia
to illustrate the unexpected complexity of human genetics and the
bottlenecks to practical application of genomics research. He further notes
that the results of recent genetics research support an anti-pharmaceutical
model, whereby genetic testing may indicate which drugs a patient should
not take. In addition, he explores statutory and regulatory hurdles to
advances in disease diagnosis, such the Bayh-Dole Act, Medicare
Legislation, and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, from
the perspective of an academic medical research scientist. The author
questions the effectiveness of academic research that is increasingly
commercialized in the Bayh-Dole era, and the limited success of the private
sector in these crucial research areas. The author concludes that future
genomic research will require significantly increased numbers of patient-
participants in the research process, which may necessitate a reshaping of
the pharmaceutical approach to medicine and the limited stake that patients
have in the breakthroughs developed through their participation in the
process.
Dr. Alice Martin and Dr. Sendil Devadas' article, "Patents with an 'I' =
Patients," also provides a comparative perspective - to all of the other
articles in the Symposium Issue on the question of whether patents are
consistent with patient interests. The authors argue that patents are
inherently reconcilable with patient needs since without patents, there
would be no important medical innovations. The authors assert that patent
protection in the United States is often quite narrow in scope, difficult to
obtain, and insufficient in duration; thus stifling research and development
of potential breakthrough pharmaceuticals. The authors note that the
private sector is predominantly responsible for the necessary clinical
research that results in translating basic research into applied drugs and that
proposals for open source sharing do not address this. Without the patent
guarantee of exclusivity, companies do not have an incentive to develop
necessary products. The authors further posit a correlation between patents
and economic growth, suggesting that the United States' lead in
biotechnology was fostered by strong patent rights and is now an example
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that other countries are following. They discuss evidence that countries
with stronger patent systems experienced increases in foreign direct
investment.
In addressing critics of biotechnology patents, the authors provide a
series of testimonials to support their position and suggest that high profile
controversies may have an undue impact on policy makers. For instance,
the authors contend that the controversy surrounding Myriad Genetics'
BRCA-1 breast cancer gene patents reflect not a problem with patentability
per se, but with enforcement of patents. The authors assert that there is no
empirical evidence of a problem with patents impeding scientific research,
including the fact that there is thus far minimal litigation for the number of
gene patents issued. The authors conclude that given the substantial
evidence of the patent system's benefits, and the mere speculation that
biotechnology patents have a deleterious effect on patients, policy makers
should avoid unnecessary tinkering with a system that is not broken for fear
of negatively impacting innovation that will benefit all patients.
The Symposium Issue concludes with a comment by Ann Weilbaecher,
entitled "Diseases Endemic in Developing Countries: How to Incentivize
Innovation." This comment focuses on innovation problems - as well as
solutions - for neglected diseases in developing countries. The comment
begins by providing important context to the problem of historically
inadequate innovation in this area and how traditional patent incentives
exacerbate the problem by not only failing to provide any direct incentive,
but also potentially creating difficulties for downstream research. The
majority of the comment focuses on potential solutions to address this
problem, using three possible themes proposed by the WHO's recent Global
Strategy as a framework - open source, patent pools, and prizes. The
comment builds upon the bare bone suggestions of the WHO to include
specific and current examples that have been suggested and/or implemented
in each of these areas in both the domestic and international arenas. The
last possible solution proposed is the concept of "wild card" patent
extensions as a contrasting model that leverages the existing patent system
to incentive research and development. The author concludes that a
combination of solutions may provide the best framework for the creation
of essential medicines for neglected diseases.
VII. PREVIEW OF NEXT ISSUE
Another issue beyond patents, but still related to the Symposium is the
question of how to improve unequal access to new medical technologies for
patients of differing socioeconomic backgrounds. While patents are the
primary target of criticism concerning access to medicine, many patients
may have problems achieving effective access of even unpatented
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treatment. The next issue (Winter 2010) will include an article by Professor
Frank Pasquale, a visiting scholar and featured speaker at the November
2008 Second Annual Beazley Symposium on this topic. Professor Pasquale
extends the discussion beyond the original framework of patents impacting
access to medicine to consider issues of access that exist regardless of
patents, as well as how to address them. In particular, he will be discussing
the use of targeted taxation as an alternative to blunt bans or complex
regulatory conditions as a creative and context-specific condition for
promoting better allocation of resources. The Annals of Health Law is
excited to publish this piece in the next edition to continue the important
discussion of how to promote access to medicine in a variety of contexts.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The articles in this Issue illustrate the range of perspectives on the
important question of whether there is a need to choose between patents
versus patients. Some authors suggest side-stepping the patent system with
other alternatives, such as prizes or open source initiatives. Others focus on
highlighting existing conflicts not only in the area of access to medicines,
but also in the increasingly complex field of biomarkers and genomic tests.
Still others suggest that the current patent system is unduly criticized and is
in fact the best way to promote innovation and patient care. It is our hope
that these diverse perspectives stimulate greater discussion and awareness
of important controversies regarding patents and access to healthcare
treatment and innovation.
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